Enforcing labor regulations requires a government in a given country to possess both the capacity and the political will to uphold the law. A deficiency in either adversely affects enforcement. Many developing countries lack adequate capacity : financial resources, inspectors and the technical skills, to enforce labor regulations. And as more countries integrate into the global economy and trade competition intensifies, less developed countries are tempted to exploit low production costs and cheap labor to invite investment and spur economic growth. It therefore becomes difficult to acquire the political will necessary to enforce labor laws and regulations in a country that is deploying such a strategy for competitive gain.
The political economy of labor provisions in trade agreements
i NAFTA is a regional trade agreement between Mexico, the United States and Canada A strategy predicated on depressing production costs through cheap labor and poor conditions not only negatively impacts the workers in those countries, but also has adverse implications for other nations. First, it distorts the global competitive playing field by allowing the nations with low production costs to export at excessively low prices. 
"Enforcing labor regulations requires a government in a given country to possess both the capacity and the political will to uphold the law. A deficiency in either adversely affects enforcement."
Labor provisions in trade agreements are intended to hold the signatories responsible for maintaining commitments with respect to labor rights. These commitments pertain to (a) the scope of national laws to protect labor rights and ensuring that they conform to international standards, and (b) enforcing existing laws. 
-The side agreement on labor
The North American Agreement on Labor iii The eleven guiding principles are: (i) Freedom of association and the protection of the right to organize, (ii) the right to bargain collectively, (iii) the right to strike, (iv) prohibition of forced labor, (v) labor protections for children and young persons, (vi) minimum employment standards,
-From side-agreement to a labor chapter
One notable difference between the NAALC and additional increase of 5 percent during the next three years. There is also a 10 percent increase during the two years before signature suggesting that countries hired additional inspectors during the negotiation process. Figure 2B , on the other hand, shows a much larger increase in inspections (i.e., 10 percent during the year of signature and 30 percent afterwards), and little change during the negotiation process.
-Data

-Econometric evidence
The basic econometric model we use is: In all regression models we compute standard errors clustering by country to control for serial correlation. (4) we only include country and year fixed effects.
In columns (2) and (5) we add a set of political and economic variables that could be correlated with both FTA and enforcement. vii Finally, in columns
(3) and (6) we include a complete set of interaction terms between year dummies and indicator variables denoting the three major geographic sub-regions (Central America, Caribbean, and South America) to allow for differential regional trends.
The results indicate that signing an FTA with the 16) . Second, they could also be correlated with FTA since both signing countries select to enter into the agreement, and that decision is likely to be affected by the current and expected political and economic condition in each country. 
